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Class Action Fairness Act of 2005:
The Eight-Year Saga Is Finally Over
ANNA ANDREEVA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite its undeniably noble goal of achieving the greatest good for
the largest number of people, in the past decade the class action device
has been severely criticized for its numerous drawbacks and for its wide-
spread abuse in the modem legal world. The critics scold class actions
for the unfair settlements they produce, which primarily benefit lawyers
rather than class members. At the same time, the critics condemn plain-
tiffs and their counsel for evading litigation in federal courts by means
of artful pleading. Finally, they argue that plaintiffs' attorneys bring
unsupported claims against innocent parties, forcing them to settle rather
than risk a large judgment. These problems and many others led Con-
gress to finally pass the Class Action Fairness Act of 20051 (hereinafter
the Act), the sixth attempt after five previous class action bills died with-
out ever making it to the President's desk.
The Act amends "procedures that apply to consideration of inter-
state class actions to assure fairer outcomes for class members and
defendants."2 It requires stringent judicial scrutiny for settlements under
which plaintiffs receive non-cash benefits or which result in a net loss to
the plaintiffs.3 It also provides that contingent fees in coupon settle-
ments shall be based on the value of the coupons actually redeemed,
rather than the face value of such coupons.4 Likewise, it bans settle-
ments that discriminate on the basis of the members' geographical prox-
imity to the court.' Finally, the Act grants federal district courts original
and removal jurisdiction in class actions if the amount in controversy
exceeds five million dollars, provided that minimal diversity exists.6
While the measure has many supporters, its critics have voiced a
number of objections as well. The opposition points to the fact that the
* J.D. 2005, University of Miami School of Law. I am thankful to Professor Minnette
Massey for her guidance on this article.
1. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. Id. at pmbl.
3. Id. § 3(a).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. §§ 4-5.
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Act disturbs the delicate balance between federal and state court sys-
tems7 and significantly undermines states' rights and state sovereignty.8
The legislation's critics further argue that the Act will cause an overload
in the federal judicial docket9 and, as an example, point out that Chief
Justice Rehnquist himself is strongly opposed to new laws that cause
more cases to be brought in federal court. 1o Moreover, they suggest that
the Act unjustifiably bashes class action lawyers based on the wrong
perception that "lawyers are a ravenous horde seeking to take advantage
of others' real or imagined misfortunes."'"
This article will provide an in-depth analysis of the Act and its
impact on the state of class action litigation today. Part II discusses the
legislative history of the Act and explains how it changes the procedures
applicable to class actions. Part III addresses the arguments in favor of
the class action reforms and the major criticisms of the class action
device. It then provides rebuttal to the supporters' concerns and sug-
gests possible negative effects of such legislation on class actions.
Finally, Part IV concludes that despite extensive opportunities for abuse
of the class action device, the courts have many mechanisms they can
utilize to minimize the risks of its misuse. The Act, on the other hand,
while incapable of resolving the existing issues with class action litiga-
tion, can potentially create even more problems.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Act
Attempts to pass class action legislation in various forms had been
made by Congress since 1998. A bill "[t]o amend title 28, United States
Code, to enlarge Federal Court jurisdiction over purported class actions"
first appeared in the 105th Congress and was entitled the Class Action
Jurisdiction Act of 1998.12 It simplified the removal procedure and gave
federal courts original jurisdiction in class action lawsuits if the amount
in controversy exceeded one million dollars or if the suit met one of the
7. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H741 (2005) (statement of Rep. Udall) ("[The Act] excessively
tilts the balance between the States and the Federal government ....").
8. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H644 (2005) (statement of Rep. McGovern); Mary Alexander,
Double Standards on Capitol Hill, TRIAL, June 2003, at 9.
9. See Policy Paper, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, The Impact of the
"Class Action Fairness Act" on Civil Rights Cases 2 (Apr. 3, 2003), at http://www.lawyerscomm.
org/publications/press/pdf/classactionmemo.pdf; 151 CoNG. REc. H736 (2005) (statement of Rep.
Scott); id. at H737 (statement of Rep. Inslee).
10. See 151 CONG. REC. H751 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee); see also 149 CONG.
REc. H5273 (2003) (statement of Rep. Frost).
11. Thomas A. Donovan, Proposed Class Action Legislation Will Not Do Much to Improve a
Lawyer's Image, 50-SEP FED. LAW. 30, 31 (2003).
12. Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998, H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998).
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minimal diversity requirements.' 3 Although the full House never con-
sidered that bill, the following year a similar legislation was referred to
and then reported out of the House Committee on the Judiciary. This
time it was called the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999,"4
and the House passed it by a close vote;' 5 however, the measure was not
considered on the Senate floor.
Three years later, efforts to enact this type of legislation were
renewed when the House passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2002
by a 233 to 190 vote.' 6 Although the 107th Congress adjourned before
the Senate voted on the bill, a new version was reintroduced in the 108th
Congress. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 was introduced on
March 6, 2003.'" This bill was similar to the 107th Congress's House
Bill 2341, but the new bill did not include some of the requirements
present in the old one, such as the disclosure of attorney's fees, public
records, or a report from the Judicial Conference of the United States on
class action fees and settlements.' 8
The Senate's version of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003,
Senate Bill 274, was introduced on February 4, 2003, by Senator Charles
Grassley (R-Iowa). 19 Unlike House Bill 1115, the Senate version
required disclosure of proposed class action settlements to state and fed-
eral officials. 20 The Senate Judiciary Committee also suggested two
substantial amendments to the measure. The first amendment increased
the amount in controversy required for original federal jurisdiction to
five million dollars. 2 ' The second amendment eliminated the general
language barring removal when a "substantial majority" of plaintiffs are
not diverse from the defendant. 22 Instead, the revised version of that
provision stated that a case must remain in state court if two-thirds of the
13. Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998, H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. §§ 2-3 (1998) (ver. 2,
Sept. 11, 1998); H.R. REP. No. 105-702, at 2-3 (1998) (report by the Committee on the Judiciary)
(reporting favorably on the Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998 and recommending that the bill
pass as amended by the Committee). House Bill 3789 was shorter than the legislation and
contained only five sections.
14. Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R.
REP. No. 106-320 (1999) (report from the Committee on the Judiciary) (recommending the bill as
amended by the Committee pass).
15. See 106 CONG. REc. H8594 (1999) (passing the bill with a vote of 222 to 207 with four
members not voting).
16. See 148 CONG. REc. H885 (2002).
17. See 149 CONG. REc. E405 (2003) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
18. Compare Class Action Fairness Act of 2002, H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. §§ 3(a), 7 (2002),
with Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003).
19. See 149 CONG. REc. S1873 (2003).
20. Compare 149 CONG. REC. S 1875-77 (2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley and printed bill),
with H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003).
21. See Washington in Brief, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2003, at A6.
22. See 149 CONG. REc. S1875 (Feb. 4, 2003).
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plaintiffs are from the same state as the defendant, and it must be
removed to federal court if fewer than one-third of the plaintiffs are from
the same state as the defendant.23 The amendment also gave federal
judges discretion to reject removal if more than one-third, but less than
two-thirds, of plaintiffs are from the same state as the defendant. 4
Although the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 passed in the
House in June 2003, the Senate never voted on it. In October 2003,
proponents of the bill came only one vote short in their attempt to end a
filibuster in the Senate.
The proponents of the Act, however, did not give up easily.
Almost immediately they started working on compromise legislation
that would both protect plaintiffs' rights and help eliminate some of the
abusive practices associated with class actions. 26 After six months of
negotiations and compromise, the bill was reintroduced in the Senate in
2004, but it died again in July when Democratic senators attached unre-
lated provisions.
After President Bush's inauguration in January 2005, the measure
was immediately reintroduced in the Senate, and this time it swept
through, seventy-two to twenty-six.2 7 The House followed suit on Feb-
ruary 17, 2005, with a 279 to 149 vote,28 and President Bush signed the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 into law the very next day.29
B. Summary of the Act
The Act changes the procedures applicable to interstate class
actions in an attempt to create fairer outcomes for all the parties
involved. It bans inadequate settlements for the class members and
ensures that the attorneys do not receive a disproportionately large
amount of the settlements.3 ° The Act also aims to "restore the intent of
the framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal
court consideration of interstate cases of national importance' '3 and to
23. See James Politi, Senate Moves to Curb Class Action Lawsuits, FIN. TIsS (London), Apr.
12, 2003, at 7.
24. See id.
25. See Michael I. Krauss, Liggett Group v. Engle: A Case Study of Class Action Abuse,
LEGAL BACKOROUNDER, Oct. 31, 2003, at 4.
26. See Class Action Victory: Sen. Schumer Helps Lead the Way to an Equitable
Compromise, THE TIMES UNION (Albany), Dec. 3, 2003, at A12.
27. See 151 CONG. Rac. S1249 (2005).
28. See 151 CONG. REC. H755 (2005).
29. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at the Signing of the Class-Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (Feb. 18, 2005). The full text of President Bush's speech delivered at the
signing of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 is available at www.whitehouse.gov./news/re
leases/2005/02/20050218-1 1.html.
30. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 3(a), 119 Stat. 4.
31. Id. § 2(b)(2).
[Vol. 59:385
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005
"benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering consumer
prices."32
The class action measure contains nine sections, five of which war-
rant a closer look. Section 2 is particularly interesting because it con-
tains the Congress' findings upon which the Act is based. After
reiterating the importance of and the general purposes behind class
actions, this section explains the various abuses of the class action
device that have taken place in the American legal system over the past
decade. One of the enumerated problems with class actions is that plain-
tiffs' lawyers have been garnishing large fees, whereas class members
are often left with coupons from the companies whose products harmed
them in the first place.33 Furthermore, the publication of confusing
notices "prevent[s] class members from being able to fully understand
and effectively exercise their rights."34 Other findings by Congress are
that state and local courts are deciding cases of national importance35
and are "acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State
defendants."36 Additionally, Congress found that such exploitation of
class actions has undercut the national judicial system, interstate com-
merce, and the Framers' intent in creating diversity jurisdiction.37
Section 3 contains a consumer "Bill of Rights" and is an important
part of the Act as it significantly changes the procedures for interstate
class actions. First, this section addresses attorney's fees in coupon set-
tlements and provides that class counsel will no longer be able to base
their contingent fees on a settlement value that assumes a hundred per-
cent redemption rate. 38 Instead, under Section 3, the attorney's fees
must be based on the value of the coupons actually redeemed, and the
court is allowed to hear expert testimony as to the "actual value to the
class members of the coupons that are redeemed. 39
Second, Section 3 requires closer judicial scrutiny of proposed set-
tlements under which class members would receive noncash benefits.
Specifically, it requires a fairness hearing and a written finding that the
settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members" before
the court can approve such settlements.4" Additionally, with respect to
settlements that result in a net loss to the class members, the court must
32. Id. § 2(b)(3).
33. Id. § 2(a)(3)(A).
34. Id. § 2(a)(3)(C).
35. Id. § 2(a)(4)(A).
36. Id. § 2(a)(4)(B).
37. Id. § 2(a)(4).
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find "that nonmonetary benefits to the class member [(injunctive relief,
for example)] substantially outweigh the monetary loss." 4 1
Third, this section prohibits unequal treatment of class members
based solely on their proximity to the court.42 Thus, settlements award-
ing a larger portion of the proceeds to the class representative are not
allowed under this section unless the representative's larger share is
attributable to costs and time spent in representing the class.
Section 4, entitled "Federal District Court Jurisdiction for Interstate
Class Actions," is by far one of the most controversial sections in the
bill. It amends 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in that it gives federal courts original
jurisdiction "of any civil action in which the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and
CoStS." ' 43 Most importantly, this section allows aggregation of individual
class members' claims for purposes of determining whether the
$5,000,000 requirement has been satisfied. 4 In such large interstate
class actions, the Act requires only that one plaintiff and one defendant
be citizens of different states,45 a concept known as "minimal diversity."
Section 4 also leaves it in the district court's discretion to decline
jurisdiction over a case that meets the minimal diversity and the amount
in controversy requirements if between one-third and two-thirds of
plaintiffs as well as the primary defendants are citizens of the state
where the action was originally filed.46 There are several factors a fed-
eral court may consider in deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction in
such cases. They include whether the claims "involve matters of
national or interstate interest, '47 whether the claims will be governed by
the laws of other states, whether the class action has been artfully
pleaded to avoid federal jurisdiction, and whether the original forum has
a "distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the
defendants. 48
If, however, more than two-thirds of plaintiffs and at least one sig-
nificant defendant are citizens of the state in which the action was origi-
nally filed, and if the plaintiffs' principal injuries were incurred in that
state, the district court may not exercise jurisdiction.49 Jurisdiction must
also be declined if two-thirds or more of class members and the primary
41. Id.
42. Id.
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defendants are citizens of the same state where the action was filed.5"
Moreover, if there are less than 100 plaintiffs in total, the federal courts
shall likewise decline jurisdiction over a class action. 1 Furthermore,
Section 4 lists a number of specific cases in which federal courts do not
have original jurisdiction under this Act, including claims under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
claims relating to internal corporate affairs of certain business
enterprises.52
Finally, Section 4 introduces a new concept of "mass action,"
defined as any civil action in which 100 or more persons propose to try
their claims jointly.53 This section provides that even if the plaintiffs in
such a mass action do not seek a class certification order, the action will
nevertheless be treated as a class action, provided that it otherwise satis-
fies the additional requirements contained in that section. The propo-
nents of the Act included this provision because "mass actions are really
class actions in disguise" and, therefore, lead to the same type of abuses
as class actions.54
Section 5 of the Act allows for the removal of class action suits by
any defendant without the consent of all defendants, even if any defen-
dant is a citizen of the state in which the action was brought. If the
district court remands the case back to the state court, the defendants
have seven days to appeal the remand order.56 Unless the appellate
court extends the time for appeal, the action on the appeal of a remand
order must be complete within sixty days after filing. 57
Section 6 of the Act requires the Judicial Conference of the United
States to prepare and transmit to the House and Senate Judiciary Com-
mittees a report on class action settlements within twelve months of
enactment. 58 Although this section does not state whether Congress
plans to rely on the Judicial Conference's report to pass additional class
action reform legislation, a Republican-controlled Congress may seek to
legislate further. Section 7 provides for the enactment of Judicial Con-





54. See 151 CONG. REc. H732 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (stating that mass
actions "involve an element of people who want their claims adjudicated together, and they often
result in the same abuses as class actions").
55. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5(a), 119 Stat. 4. Note that the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 allowed for the removal by either side.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 6(a).
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any way restrict the authority of the Judicial Conference and the
Supreme Court to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure.
Finally, the last section of the bill, Section 9, states that the legislation
does not apply retroactively.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Arguments in Favor of the Act
Proponents of the Act state that "[t]he class action judicial system
has become a joke, and no one is laughing except the trial lawyers.., all
the way to the bank."59 So what exactly are the supporters of the class
action legislation concerned with?
1. UNFAIR SETTLEMENTS
Among the proponents' numerous complaints is the fact that in too
many class action settlements consumers receive coupons or something
else of little or no value while their lawyers walk away with millions in
legal fees. 6" The endless examples they cite are disturbing indeed. For
instance, in one lawsuit brought against Blockbuster over late fees, class
members received coupons for one dollar, "buy one, get one free" cou-
pons, and free Blockbuster Favorites video rentals. 61 Attorneys for the
plaintiffs, on the other hand, were awarded $9.25 million.62 A class
action against Cheerios over food additives resulted in a settlement pro-
ducing close to two million dollars in attorney's fees while leaving indi-
vidual class members with coupons for more Cheerios.6 3 In an
accounting practice dispute involving Bank of Boston, the settlement
produced an $8.5 million attorneys' fee and actually cost the class mem-
bers because they each had to pay an additional ninety dollars debited
59. 151 CONG. REC. H726 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
60. See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (stating that the present class action
system produces "outrageous settlements that benefit only lawyers and trample the rights of class
members," and that today's class actions "are too often used to efficiently transfer the large fees to
a small number of trial lawyers, with little benefit to the plaintiffs"); 151 CONG. REC. H735 (2005)
(statement of Rep. Keller); 151 CONG. REc. H748 (2005) (statement of Rep. Blunt).
61. See 149 CONG. REC. H5277 (2003) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte); 151 CONG. REc. H735
(2005) (statement of Rep. Cannon); id. at H735 (2005) (statement of Rep. Keller); 151 CONG.
REC. S 1226 (2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter); Lloyd Milliken, Jr., Fixing the Broken Class Action
Lawsuit System, REs GESTAE, July-Aug. 2003, at 20.
62. 151 CONG. REc. H735 (2005) (statement of Rep. Cannon); id. at H735 (2005) (statement
of Rep. Keller); 151 CONG. REC. S 1226 (2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter); Milliken, Jr., supra note
61, at 20.
63. See 151 CONG. REc. H735 (2005) (statement of Rep. Keller); 151 CONG. REC. S1226
(2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter) (assessing the lawyers' fees at the slightly lower amount of 1.75
million dollars); id. at S 1241 (2005) (statement of Sen. Dole) (reiterating the 1.75 million figure
for attorneys' fees).
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directly from their mortgage accounts.64 Yet, the favorite case cited in
support of the Act is a lawsuit against Chase Manhattan Bank in which
consumers were awarded thirty-three cent checks. In order to accept the
thirty-three cent check, however, each class member had to use a thirty-
four cent stamp to send in his or her acceptance. Thus, while the con-
sumers suffered a one cent net loss through the award, their attorneys
emerged from the litigation with a return of four million dollars in legal
fees.6 5 In order to prevent abuses like these, the Act aims to protect
plaintiffs by prohibiting the payment of bounties to class representatives,
barring the approval of net loss settlements, requiring greater scrutiny of
coupon settlements, and limiting class counsel's contingent fees.
2. FORUM SHOPPING
The supporters' second major concern with class action abuse is
plaintiffs' forum shopping for jurisdictions most likely to approve a pro-
spective plaintiff class and award large monetary decisions. The old
system allowed class action lawsuits involving plaintiffs from nearly
every state to file suits in those few jurisdictions that are known to be
plaintiff-friendly and hostile to out-of-state defendants.66 For example,
the king of the tobacco lawyers, Richard Scruggs, complains that in such
jurisdictions "the judiciary is elected with verdict money" and that "it's
almost impossible to get a fair trial if you're a defendant. 67
In some of those infamous "magnet courts," which are known for
certifying even the most speculative class action suits, the increase in
class action filings has reached considerable proportions. For example:
There was an 82-percent increase in the number of class actions filed
in Jefferson County, [Texas], between the years of 1998 and 2000.
During the same time span, Palm Beach County, [Florida], saw a 35-
percent increase. The most dramatic increase, however, has occurred
in Madison County, [Illinois]. Madison County has seen an astonish-
ing 5,000-percent increase in the number of class action filings since
1998.68
64. See 151 CONG. REC. H735 (2005) (statement of Rep. Cannon); id. at H736 (2005)
(statement of Rep. Moran); 151 CONG. REc. S1226 (2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter).
65. See 149 CONG. REC. H5277 (2003) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
66. See 151 CONG. REC. HH726 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); id. at H735
(2005) (statement of Rep. Keller); id. at H741 (2005) (statement of Rep. Hasten); 151 CONG. REc.
S 1225 (2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter); id. at S 1227-28 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at
S1235 (2005) (statement of Sen. Sessions).
67. Breaking With the Bar, N.Y. SUN, Nov. 20, 2003, at 8.
68. 151 CONG. REc. S1228 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch). It was noted in the House that
Madison County, Illinois, the area experiencing the largest growth in class action litigation, is a
rural county consisting of a population of 250,000 people. 149 CONG. REC. H5281 (2003)
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); see also 151 CONG. REC. HH726 (2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
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What is more interesting is that a large percentage of all class
actions filed in Madison County involved nationwide cases, such as all
Sprint customers in the United States ever disconnected on a cell phone,
"all Roto-Rooter customers nationwide whose drains were repaired by
unlicensed plumbers, and all nationwide customers who purchased a
'limited edition' Barbie doll at a higher price. "69
Such a large number of class actions filed in Madison County is
particularly suspicious, since there appears to be no evidence that the
people of that county are "somehow cursed or more plagued by injuries
than the average citizen."70 As one Congressman suggested, the only
plausible explanation for this phenomenon is "aggressive forum shop-
ping by trial lawyers to find courts and judges who will act as willing
accomplices in a judicial power grab, hearing nationwide cases and set-
ting policy for the entire country."'" These judges in effect regulate
products and services produced elsewhere and sold nationally. Cer-
tainly, if a district court can automatically apply its own law to a nation-
wide class, the plaintiffs can shop for the forum that is most likely to
return a favorable verdict or award the greatest damages. A decision
binds the class, thereby frustrating the substantive policies of those
states whose law could potentially have been applied to the action, but
which were avoided by the plaintiff's strategic choice of forum.
3. ARTFUL PLEADING
Related to the problem of forum shopping is one of artful pleading.
Proponents of the Act advocate that many defendant businesses are
forced to litigate truly interstate class action lawsuits in state courts.
7 2
Because plaintiffs artfully plead their complaints, defendants are unable
to remove actions to a federal court even though they are often signifi-
cant lawsuits involving a great number of citizens with numerous inter-
state commerce implications. According to one commentator, the filing
of a single class action in a state court often leads to a number of "copy-
cat" cases being filed in other jurisdictions.73 While on the federal level
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has the authority to transfer
69. 149 CONG. REc. H5281 (2003) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
70. Id.
71. 151 CONG. REc. H726 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); see also 149 CONG.
REC. H5281 (2003) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
72. See 151 CONG. REC. S1245 (2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd); see also Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b), 119 Stat. 4 (providing that one of its purposes is
to provide "for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance"); id.
§ 4(a)(2) (stating that one of the factors in determining the existence of diversity jurisdiction is
"whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction").
73. See 151 CONG. REC. S1248-49 (2005) (statement of Sen. Frist); 151 CONG. REc. H735
(2005) (statement of Rep. Cannon); Milliken, Jr., supra note 61, at 19-20.
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related cases to a single federal district court, these cases cannot be con-
solidated on a state level. This, in turn, leads to a waste of judicial
resources and inconsistent outcomes in different state courts. 74 Before
the Act was passed, the two main reasons why the defendants might not
have been able to remove an interstate class action to a federal court
were: (1) the complaint on its face did not involve a federal question,
and (2) the amount in controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction
was not satisfied or there was no complete diversity in the case.
First, a class action might not have been removable because a fed-
eral question did not appear on the face of the complaint. The "well-
pleaded complaint rule" governs the presence or absence of federal-
question jurisdiction in a case. This rule provides that "federal jurisdic-
tion exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint."75 Because a defense is not part
of the plaintiff's properly pleaded statement of his or her claim, "a case
may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense,
... even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiffs complaint, and
even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at
issue in the case."76 Thus, when both state and federal law create a
cause of action, a plaintiff, as "master of the claim," may obtain federal
jurisdiction by raising the federal claim, or, conversely, "may avoid fed-
eral jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law."7 7 In the latter case,
it logically follows that any remedy under federal law is waived.
Second, a non-federal question class action may not have been
removable before passage of the 2005 Act because complete diversity
was wanting or the amount in controversy had not been satisfied. To
make sure that actions filed in a state court remained in that court, plain-
tiffs' counsel tried very hard to draft their complaints in a way that pre-
cluded removal on diversity grounds.78 One commentator noted:
[S]ome of the fiercest battles now being waged in the class action
arena concern the removability of non-federal question class actions
filed originally in state court. The jurisdictional issues include
whether and how a named plaintiff may voluntarily limit in the com-
plaint the actual damages sought, how the amount in controversy is
determined, whether the plaintiff has sought to recast a federal claim
into a state claim through "artful pleading," and whether a plaintiff
74. See Milliken, Jr., supra note 61, at 20; Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71
N.Y.U. L. REv. 514, 520 (1996).
75. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
76. Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)).
77. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.
78. See Joel S. Feldman et al., Consumer Fraud Act Class Actions in State Courts 67, 82
(ALI-ABA Course of Study, May 2-3, 2002), available in Westlaw SG092 ALI-ABA 67.
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has wrongfully sued non-diverse defendants who do not belong in the
action in an attempt to defeat jurisdiction.7 9
Before the Act, federal law permitted removal of a non-federal
class action only if complete diversity of citizenship between all the
named plaintiffs and all the defendants was found.8 0 Hence, class coun-
sel could effectively get around removal from a friendly state court
either by "naming as a plaintiff a class member who [was] a citizen of
the same state as one of the defendants or by naming as a defendant an
individual or a corporation that [was] resident in or incorporated in the
same state in which one of the named plaintiffs reside[d]."'"
In examining the second requirement of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion, the amount in controversy, a court has to look at the complaint and
accept the amount of damages pled unless it appears to a legal certainty
that the plaintiff in good faith cannot claim the jurisdictional amount.
82
"[A] removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the
... jurisdictional requirement."83 Since the plaintiff is the "master" of
the complaint, prior to the enactment of the Act, plaintiffs counsel
could strategically choose to claim damages in the amount that was less
than the currently required $75,000 for each member of the class. This
technique, in effect, defeated any possibility of removal by a diverse
defendant even though the total amount of damages may have been mea-
sured in millions, if not billions, of dollars and, thus, ensured that the
action would be tried in the court of plaintiffs choice.
Furthermore, in jurisdictions subscribing to the view that Zahn v.
International Paper Co.84 survived the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367,85
the plaintiff s attorneys could even plead damages in excess of the juris-
dictional amount for some of the class members and still defeat removal
to a federal court.
The Supreme Court in Zahn held that "[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule
23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount" before the
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969).
81. Donovan, supra note 11, at 31.
82. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938). Unless
challenged by the opposition or the court, a plaintiffs general allegation that the dispute exceeds
the jurisdictional minimum is sufficient to support jurisdiction. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66,
72 (1939).
83. Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11 th Cir. 1996); see also Gafford
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 160 (6th Cir. 1993).
84. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
85. "[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
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lawsuit becomes removable.86 However, this longstanding construction
of the "matter in controversy" requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 was
questioned in some circuits subsequent to Congress' passing the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990.87 For example, in Free v. Abbott Labs. the
Fifth Circuit decided that § 1367 overruled Zahn and that a district court
could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a class even if
they did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement. 88 A year
later, in Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., the Sev-
enth Circuit followed the decision in Abbott Labs in a case with only
two named plaintiffs, one of whom met the jurisdictional minimum and
one who did not.89 Relying on Abbott Labs, the court in Stromberg
ruled that § 1367 gave district courts supplemental jurisdiction over
individually named plaintiffs who did not meet the jurisdictional mini-
mum, provided that another individually named plaintiff satisfied that
threshold.90 Most recently, in Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,
the Eleventh Circuit joined the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Cir-
cuits in holding that the enactment of supplemental jurisdiction in
§ 1367 overruled Zahn.9 '
The Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, have
taken the opposite view - that Zahn continues in force notwithstanding
the enactment of § 1367. In Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., the Tenth
Circuit found that § 1367(a) and (b) literally and unambiguously
required each member of the plaintiff class to satisfy the Zahn definition
of "matter in controversy" and to individually meet the $75,000 require-
ment.92 Likewise, the Third Circuit in Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mer-
cury Insurance Co. concluded that Congress intended to leave Zahn
untouched when it passed 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 93 The Eighth Circuit also
held that the rule of Zahn remained intact despite Congress's enactment
of supplemental jurisdiction.94 Hence, the 30,000-plus members of the
plaintiff class in that case had to each satisfy the jurisdictional amount-
in-controversy requirement for the district court to exercise subject mat-
86. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
87. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
88. Free v. Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided court,
529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam).
89. Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1996).
90. Id. at 931.
91. Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248 (1 1th Cir. 2003). For analyses of
the effect of supplemental jurisdiction on Zahn and its progeny from other circuits, see, for
example, Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001), and Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261
F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001).
92. Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 640 (10th Cir. 1998).
93. Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1999).
94. Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 962 (8th Cir. 2000).
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ter jurisdiction over their claims.95
Accordingly, if a class action lawsuit was brought in either the
Third, Eighth, or Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff's counsel could defeat
diversity jurisdiction and removal by the defendants even though some
members of the class claimed damages in excess of the jurisdictional
amount. This is because Zahn does not permit aggregation for purposes
of meeting the amount-in-controversy requirement and requires that
each member of a class action satisfy the threshold amount before
removal is possible. On the other hand, if the suit was filed in the
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, or Eleventh Circuits, plaintiffs counsel
had to plead less than the jurisdictional amount for each member of the
class to prevent the case from being removed to the district court. While
the Act sets forth a provision requiring aggregation of claims to meet the
five million dollar removal threshold, it does nothing to resolve the cir-
cuits' conflict in interpreting Zahn.96
4. NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON ECONOMY
Finally, supporters of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 argue
that current class action abuses have adverse effect on businesses and
disrupt the U.S. economy in general because many innocent defendants
are forced to settle cases to avoid risking inordinate judgments by local
juries.9 7 They suggest that sometimes plaintiffs' counsel file multiple
suits designed to coerce quick and often unwarranted settlements with a
simple settlement demand. "And what company wouldn't pay the
defense costs to get out of this type of abusive jurisdiction of the various
courts throughout the country."9 8 The large amount of fees attorneys
receive, proponents of the Act say, "too often do not constitute legiti-
mate harm, because many companies agree to these settlements in order
to lower the costs of nuisance lawsuits." 99
The supporters of the Act further note that this deluge of frivolous
95. Id.
96. See infra Part III.C.1.
97. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H747 (2005) (statement of Rep. Blunt) ("Frivolous lawsuits are
clogging America's judicial system, endangering America's small businesses, jeopardizing jobs,
and driving up prices for consumers."); 151 CONG. REc. S 1226 (2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter);
151 CONG. REc. S 1229 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, H.R. 516, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (2005) ("Abusive interstate class actions have harmed
society as a whole by forcing innocent parties to settle cases rather than risk a huge judgment by a
local jury, thereby costing consumers billions of dollars in increased costs to pay for forced
settlements and excessive judgments.").
98. 151 CONG. REc. S1229 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
99. 149 CONG. REc. H5278 (2003) (statement of Rep. King).
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class actions stunts economic growth and job creation. 10 It also leads to
higher prices for consumers: the so-called "Tort Tax makes consumers
pay more for the goods and services they use. The Tort Tax adds to the
cost of everything we buy because businesses and manufacturers have to
cover themselves and their employees - just in case they get sued by a
greedy personal injury lawyer."'' For example, according to House
Representative Hastert, the last estimate showed that this Tort Tax "cost
the nation's economy $246 billion a year, and by 2006, it will cost the
average American nearly $1000 more each year on their purchases
because of defensive business practices."' 2 Other statistics offered by
the proponents of the Act to back up this argument is that the "tort sys-
tem consumes up to 3 percent of [the U.S.] gross domestic product."'
' 0 3
Since a 3.5 percent GDP is needed just to sustain the economy, then
"our economy has to grow at 6 1/2 percent in order to make up for the 3
percent that is consumed in our tort system."'' Others reiterate those
fears:
Class action lawsuits also pose a threat to investors and the security
of American retirement plans, which are largely invested in equity
securities of American corporations. While class action liability can
be enormous, news of these lawsuits on Wall Street can drive down
any particular stock by as much as 10 points in one day.05
B. Rebuttal to the Proponents' Concerns
This section addresses the issues with which the Act's supporters
are concerned and discusses whether these concerns are warranted.
1. THE "UNFAIRNESS" OF SETTLEMENTS IS EXAGGERATED
Although class action settlements may at first blush seem extremely
unfair to class members, especially when one considers solely the exam-
ples offered by the supporters of the Act, a closer look at the settlement
awards reveals that the degree of "unfairness" is exaggerated. Certainly,
when one compares the total amount of attorneys' fees to an individual
plaintiffs recovery, as many proponents of the legislation suggest we
do, the expected conclusion is that the latter is disproportionately
smaller than the former. Coupon settlements, however, take on a differ-
ent look once the following factors are taken into account: (1) compen-
100. See 151 CONG. REc. H723-01, *H735 (2005) (statement of Rep. Cannon); id. (statement
of Rep. Keller); id. at H740-41 (statement of Rep. Hastert).
101. Id. at H741 (statement of Rep. Hastert).
102. Id.
103. See 149 CONG. REC. H5278 (2003) (statement of Rep. King).
104. Id.
105. 149 CONG. REc. H5282 (2003) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
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satory damages of individual class members in many class actions are
often very small;1 °6 (2) class actions do not exist only to provide relief
for private wrongs - another major purpose behind them is to correct,
punish, and deter big corporations;'1 7 and (3) courts are free to reject
proposed coupon settlements where it appears that they are inequitable.
Hence, supporters of the Act somewhat overstate the problems with
coupon settlements. While they can be commended on bringing to light
many unfair settlements, there is no statistical evidence of a state class
action "crisis." In fact, there is empirical evidence to the contrary. For
example, according to one Congressman, the RAND Institute for Civil
Justice has conducted a study of class action settlements and found that
"given the small dollar amount of individuals' losses, it was 'highly
unlikely that any individual claiming such losses would find legal repre-
sentation without incurring significant personal expense.' ,10 8 Addition-
ally, the study concluded that "class counsel's fees [constitute] a modest
share of the negotiated settlements" and that its survey "contradicts the
view that damage class actions invariably produce little for class mem-
bers and that class action attorneys routinely garner the lion's share of
settlements." 10 9
Another comprehensive empirical study conducted by law profes-
sors from Cornell Law School and New York University Law School
came to the conclusion that "the amount of client recovery is over-
whelmingly the most important determinant of the attorney fee
award."1 O The study examined 370 class action settlements reported for
the period 1993-2002 in which both attorney's fees and class recovery
could be determined. It was conducted to help judges handling large
class action settlements determine reasonable attorneys' fees.
Contrary to claims by supporters of class action legislation, this
study found no evidence that either plaintiff recoveries or attorneys' fees
106. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REc. H735 (2005) (statement of Rep. Scott) ("[I]f a person at a
checkout counter calibrates the machine to just cheat [a customer] out of a few cents, what is
one's recovery in that case? Just a few cents.").
107. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE D AME L.
REV. 913, 924 (1998) (arguing that the purpose of a "small claim" class action "is solely to deter
the kind of wrong that causes a small injury to a large number"); see also 151 CONG. Ruc. H736
(2005) (statement of Rep. Scott) (opining that "some of these coupon cases are the only way that
we can rein in corporate abuse"); id. at H751 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("[I]n the
settlement comes the punishment for not doing or the incentive to not violate the law again.").
108. 149 CONG. Rac. H5281-03, *H5283 (2003) (statement of Rep. Jones).
109. Id. (quoting the RAND Institute study). For a list of published studies on class actions
and mass torts from the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, see http://www.rand.org/icj/pubs/class.
html.
110. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys Fees in Class Action Settlements: An
Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 27 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=456600.
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increased over the ten year period.11' Furthermore, the study noted a
"scaling effect," showing that "[t]he percent of the recovery that goes to
attorneys decreases as the size of the recovery increases."' 1 2 This
inverse relationship tends to support the underlying theory of class
actions, that consolidation of similar claims promotes judicial economy
and benefits clients: "As similar cases are aggregated, the efficiency
gains yield an increased net return to clients. This economy of scale
carries over to costs and expenses. Costs absorb a lower percent of the
recovery as the recovery increases.""' 3 The study also found that attor-
neys' fee awards tend to be higher in federal court than in state court.
11 4
Such a conclusion directly undercuts arguments by congressional sup-
porters of the Act that windfall attorneys' fees in some state class actions
justify sending more of the cases to federal court.
The second major concern of the Act's proponents is plaintiffs'
forum shopping and the fact that local courts are setting national policy
in the country. However, "[w]hen these jurisdictions are studied closely,
they're not shown to be out of control.""' 5 In fact, one of the co-authors
of the empirical study discussed in the previous section, Theodore
Eisenberg of Cornell Law School, expressed his skepticism "about
claims of so-called judicial 'hell holes,' - state courts where judges rou-
tinely award huge attorneys' fees at the expense of plaintiffs."
'1 16
In fact, the dangers of plaintiffs' forum shopping are significantly
reduced by the protections embedded in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e). 117 This Rule prohibits "any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or
compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class" with-
out prior approval of the court." 8 The requirement of court approval of
dismissals and settlements protects the interests of absent class members
and polices the use of class action allegations. If the court must approve
dismissal or settlement, plaintiffs are less able to act improperly. If they
misuse the class action device, the court has the power to disapprove the
settlement, disallow the dismissal, and force the plaintiffs to proceed.
This measure reduces the incentive to plaintiffs' counsel to misuse the
class action device solely in an effort to leverage a favorable settlement.
In keeping with the court's obligation to police the use of the class
111. Id.
112. Id. at 78.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 77.
115. Study Disputes Rising Attorney Fees, Recoveries in Class Action Settlements, 72 U.S. L.
WK., Jan. 20, 2004, at 2412 (quoting Theodore Eisenberg).
116. Id.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A).
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action vehicle, court approval provides the judge with a check against
forum shopping. Court approval of dismissals prevents counsel from
dismissing class action claims upon discovery of adverse law in a juris-
diction, or upon assignment of the case to an "unfriendly" judge.
Furthermore, the whole premise of big companies' inability to get a
fair trial in certain state courts is highly questionable.1" 9 And even
where the infrequent abuse has occurred, such as in Madison County,
Illinois, for example, the opponents of the Act contend that the abuse "is
not an endemic feature of State judiciaries . . . in fact, many Federal
class actions have experienced the same outcomes that attract criticism
at the state level."
1 20
Likewise, the argument that a few plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions
are setting national policies is not justified because any attempt to apply
a single state's law to a nationwide class must first overcome the consti-
tutional hurdle raised in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.t2' The United
States Supreme Court in Shutts reversed an order certifying a nationwide
class of natural gas leaseholders seeking recovery of interest due on
delayed royalty payments. 2 2 The Court held that the Kansas court's
application of Kansas law to determine the rights of all plaintiffs vio-
lated constitutional due process.'
23
In an effort to curb the so-called "magnet forum phenomenon," the
Court in Shutts adopted a two-part test for the choice of applicable law
in a nationwide class action. First, the Court asked whether the pertinent
state's law conflicted with that of the other states represented. If so,
then in order for the forum state to have a sufficient interest to justify
application of its law to those non-residents:
[The state whose law is sought to be applied] must have a "significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts" to the claims asserted
by each member of the plaintiff class, contacts "creating state inter-
ests," in order to ensure that the choice of [the forum state's] law is
not arbitrary or unfair.
1 24
Thus, "where different state laws conflict, the contacts between each
putative class member's claims and the forum state must be sufficiently
great to make it fair for the forum to apply its law to that member's
claim." 1
25
119. See 149 CONG. REC. H5283 (2003) (statement of Rep. Jones).
120. Id.
121. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
122. Id. at 822-23.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 821-22 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
125. Feldman et al., supra note 78, at 85.
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2. ARTFUL PLEADING
Another concern with class action litigation expressed by the pro-
ponents of the Act is the plaintiffs' artful pleading of the complaints to
avoid removal. Yet, the courts will not allow a plaintiff to prevent the
defendant's access to a federal forum through artful pleading because
"the removal court will seek to determine whether the real nature of the
claim is federal, regardless of plaintiff's characterization." '126 Although
the "well-pleaded complaint rule" largely favors plaintiffs by permitting
them to choose which law, state or federal, to rely on, provided that the
cause of action arises under both, its counterpart, the artful pleading doc-
trine, compensates for this seeming inequity. According to the artful
pleading doctrine, "a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to
plead necessary federal questions in a complaint."' 27  If the court
decides that a plaintiff has "artfully pleaded" her claim in this fashion, it
may allow removal notwithstanding lack of federal question on the face
of the complaint. In particular, the plaintiff may not avoid federal juris-
diction based on a federal question where federal law completely
preempts the plaintiff's state-law claim. Although preemption is nor-
mally a defense, "[o]nce an area of state law has been completely pre-
empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is
considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises
under federal law."'
' 28
With respect to non-federal question jurisdiction of federal courts,
defendants often argue that a local class member or a local defendant has
been "fraudulently joined" to ensure that the lawsuit remains in a state
court. However, federal courts are quite capable of differentiating
between valid and fraudulent claims, and there already exists an appro-
priate procedural mechanism enabling the defendant to challenge the
propriety of joinder. As the United States Supreme Court stated:
[The] right of removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a
resident defendant having no real connection with the controversy. If
in such a case a resident defendant is joined, the joinder, although fair
upon its face, may be shown by a petition for removal to be only a
sham or fraudulent device to prevent a removal ....
One commentator explained that federal courts carefully examine
the pleadings to determine whether a party was joined in bad faith:
The question on a claim of fraudulent joinder is not whether the
126. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 n.2 (1981) (quoting C. WRIrr
ET AL., 14 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722, pp. 564-66 (1976)).
127. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).
128. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
129. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921) (citations omitted).
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plaintiff will prevail, but whether, under the claim alleged by the
plaintiff, any possibility of recovery exists. In years past, this
required an examination of the plaintiffs pleadings. Unless there
was some facial bar to recovery - such as a limitations defense
appearing on the face of the pleading or a bar of charitable immunity
- the case would be remanded because the pleadings stated a claim
for relief. In recent years, however, federal courts have treated fraud-
ulent joinder claims in a manner akin to summary judgment motions:
the court determines if any evidence exists to support the plaintiffs
claim. Federal courts do not require a plaintiff to pretry his claim,
however, or even to submit much evidence, as the defendant carries
the burden to show no possibility of recovery.'
30
Thus, even if the supporters of the Act are justified in their concerns
about plaintiffs' fraudulently joining parties in order to defeat diversity
jurisdiction, federal law already provides a device for dealing with this
problem.
3. DISRUPTION OF ECONOMY
Finally, proponents of the Act contend that many "innocent"
defendants in today's class action litigation are forced to settle their
claims to avoid risking huge judgments by local juries.' This argu-
ment, however, does not account for the existence of Rule 11132 protec-
tions against frivolous lawsuits. If the defendants are correct in saying
that too many class actions nowadays are "meritless, ' '33 then why don't
they simply utilize a motion to dismiss to eliminate frivolous class
actions? Moreover, if a suit is frivolous, it will not survive a Rule 11
motion whether it was filed in a state or a federal court. A motion to
dismiss is a customary remedy for a lawsuit without merit, and state
courts are quite capable of using it.
Furthermore, some of the Act's supporters claim that a lot of class
action lawsuits are frivolous because they result in settlements with min-
iscule benefits for class members and large attorney's fees. In fact, one
advocate of the Class Action Fairness Act went so far as to say that
130. Fred Misko, Jr. et al., Managing Complex Litigation: Class Actions and Mass Torts, 48
BAYLOR L. REv. 1001, 1027 (1996).
131. See 151 CONG. REc. H727 (2005) (statement of Rep. Boucher); id at H741 (statement of
Rep. Blumenauer); 151 CONG. REC. S1226 (2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter); id. at S1229
(statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, H.R. 516, 109th Cong.
§ 2(a)(6) (2006) ("Abusive interstate class actions have harmed society as a whole by forcing
innocent parties to settle cases rather than risk a huge judgment by a local jury, thereby costing
consumers billions of dollars in increased costs to pay for forced settlements and excessive
judgments.").
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
133. 149 CONG. Rac. H5274 (2003) (statement of Rep. Linder).
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calling such lawsuits "frivolous" is an insult to frivolousness. 34 First,
this is a wrong definition of the word "frivolous." The term does not
mean inequitable or unfair, but, rather, lacking legal merit or foundation
under the current law. 135 Second, if it were not for the class action
device, members of the class would not be able to bring an action in the
first place exactly because of such a small amount of damages.
36
Additionally, removal to federal courts does not address the prob-
lem of meritless class actions because both state and federal courts use
the same standard for a motion to dismiss. "Most state class certifica-
tion statutes copy Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'
' 37
Although some states incorporate minor differences, "state courts facing
class certification questions generally consider federal case law persua-
sive authority."'' 38 For example, "the great majority of state courts, like
the overwhelming majority of federal courts, find class treatment inap-
propriate due to manageability and predominance problems caused by
legal and factual variation."' 39 Thus, while some of the proponents'
concerns with the state of the class action litigation are unwarranted,
others can be effectively addressed by utilizing the existing procedural
techniques.
C. The Act's Negative Impact on the Class Action Litigation Today
Although the Act has seemingly noble purposes behind it and, at
least in some instances, is undoubtedly driven by valid concerns about
the modern state of class action litigation, the remedy contained in the
legislation is more severe than the disease. Some of the potential draw-
backs suggested by the opponents of the Act are that in addition to tak-
ing away states' rights, obstructing state law, and restricting liability in a
wide range of cases, it has a negative effect on interstate commerce and
unnecessarily clogs up the already overburdened federal judiciary by
expanding diversity jurisdiction. 4 ' Passage of the Act was strongly
opposed by consumer organizations and civil rights groups, such as the
American Association of Retired Persons, Consumer Federation of
America, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and National Associa-
134. 149 CONG. REc. H5284 (2003) (statement of Rep. Smith).
135. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
136. See 151 CONG. REC. H753 (2005) (statement of Rep. Brown) (stating that class actions
"do not generally involve huge losses").
137. Joel S. Feldman, Class Certification Issues For Non-Federal Question Class Actions -
Defense Perspective, in CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE STRATEGIES 194
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. HO-OOMI, 2003), available at WL
695 PLI/Lit 85.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 195.
140. See 151 CONG. REC. H751 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
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tion for the Advancement of Colored People, among others.' 41 Like-
wise, the National Association of Attorneys General' 4 2 and the
Conference of Chief Justices (of state supreme courts) were also against
the measure. 143
1. EXPANSION OF FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Some argue that the Act will have the effect of stripping states of
their rights and disrupting the notions of federalism by significantly
expanding diversity jurisdiction of federal courts."n Before the Act was
passed, federal law permitted removal of a non-federal class action only
if (1) there was complete diversity of citizenship between all the named
plaintiffs and all the defendants, and (2) the amount in controversy,
excluding costs and fees, exceeded $75,000. 14' The Act changes these
two requirements in several important ways.
First, it simplifies the removal procedure in class actions exceeding
$5,000,000 worth of damages by requiring only "minimal diversity,"
under which sufficient diversity generally exists as long as any one
defendant is a citizen of a different state than any one plaintiff.
146
Hence, even if only one defendant in the class action is diverse from the
plaintiff or plaintiffs, federal court will still have original subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. This substantially limits the plaintiffs' choice
regarding whom to name as defendants and whom to include in the
plaintiff class if they want the case to remain in a state court.
The "minimal" diversity requirement is qualified, however, by a
clause that gives federal judges discretion to decline jurisdiction if
between one-third and two-thirds of all plaintiffs and the primary
defendants are from the state where the action was originally filed. 147 In
deciding whether to exercise such discretion and remand the case back
to state court, the district court must look at the totality of the circum-
stances, including, but not limited to: (1) whether the class action
141. See id. at H727 (2005) (statement of Rep. Conyers); 151 CONG. REc. S1248 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Reid) (printing into the record a list of the companies which supported Senator
Reid's statement against the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005).
142. See Letter from National Association of Attorneys General to Sens. Frist and Reid (Feb.
7, 2005) (printed in 151 CONG. REC. H740 (2005)).
143. See 151 CONG. REC. S 1248 (2005); Senate Democrats' Secret Negotiations on Consumer
Class Action Bill Shut Out Consumer, Environment, Rights Groups, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 20,
2003, available at http://releases.usnewswire.comGetRelease.asp?id=23678.
144. See 151 CONG. REc. H751 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (stating that the Act
contains watered down requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction "resulting in the removal of
nearly all class actions to Federal court").
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000); see also Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
146. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2005)).
147. Id. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) (2005)).
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involves matters of national or interstate interest; (2) whether the claims
will be governed by laws of different states; (3) whether the action was
artfully pleaded to avoid federal jurisdiction; and (4) whether the action
was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the
alleged harm, or the defendants.
148
At the same time, another clause provides that if more than two-
thirds of plaintiffs and at least one significant defendant are citizens of
the state in which the action was originally filed and if the plaintiffs'
principal injuries were incurred in that state, the district court may not
exercise jurisdiction over the class action. 49 Jurisdiction must also be
declined if two-thirds or more of class members and the primary defend-
ants are citizens of the same state where the action was filed or if there
are less than 100 plaintiffs in total.1 50 Notwithstanding these restric-
tions, the inevitable result of a changed definition of diversity is a much
broader power of federal courts to hear non-federal class action law-
suits.15 ' This is because a change from a complete diversity requirement
to only a minimal diversity is so drastic that most class actions are now
going to be removable notwithstanding all of the exceptions to such
diversity jurisdiction contained in the Act.
Second, the Act relaxes the current amount-in-controversy require-
ment. While in some circuits § 1332 has been interpreted to allow fed-
eral jurisdiction only in those class actions where each class member has
a claim for more than the amount in controversy, 152 others have allowed
class action lawsuits to be heard in federal courts under the doctrine of
supplemental jurisdiction if at least one member's claim satisfied the
amount-in-controversy requirement. 153 The Act adds another way to get
a class action into federal court: it provides for federal diversity jurisdic-
tion if the total amount of damages asserted exceeds $5,000,000, exclu-
148. Id.
149. Id. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(4) (2005)). Congressmen referred to this
clause as a "home State exception and the local controversy exception." 151 CONG. REc. S1226
(2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter).
150. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a), 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(4), (5) (2005)).
151. See Ralph Lindeman, Class Action Bar Girds for Years of Litigation to Interpret Changes
Imposed by Reform Law, 73 U.S. L. WK., Mar. 8, 2005, at 2515.
152. See Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 962 (8th Cir. 2000); Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631,
640 (10th Cir. 1998); Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973).
153. See Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1254 (1 1th Cir. 2003); Rosmer
v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 117 (4th Cir. 2001); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 943 (9th
Cir. 2001); Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1996);
Free v. Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided court, 529 U.S.
333 (2000) (per curiam).
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sive of interest and fees.154 Additionally, the legislation allows
aggregation of the claims of all class members to meet that amount.1
55
Whether or not these provisions of the Act will supersede Zahn and
its progeny is not entirely certain. On the one hand, the legislation is
inconsistent with Zahn because it allows aggregation of claims whereas
Zahn held that plaintiffs are not permitted to aggregate in order to meet
the amount-in-controversy requirement. On the other hand, the Act does
not explicitly allow or prohibit aggregation of claims for purposes of
showing that the current $75,000 amount in controversy has been satis-
fied. The Act merely states that the individual class members shall
aggregate their claims "to determine whether the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000. ' ' 156 Neither this section nor any
other part of the Act makes any mention of whether the claims can be
aggregated for purposes of meeting the $75,000 jurisdictional amount
under § 1332. Thus, it can reasonably be concluded that the Act did not
intend to change the aggregation rules that are in operation now.
Thus, a possible result of this legislation is that the federal court
will aggregate the class members' claims to determine whether they
amount to $5,000,000 in total. If they do, the case becomes removable
even if none of the plaintiffs' claims satisfies the $75,000 amount-in-
controversy requirement. If the sum of all claims is less than
$5,000,000, the court will still have to apply the law of its circuit on the
issue of supplemental jurisdiction. For instance, if the court is in a juris-
diction that follows Zahn, 5 7 it will deny removal unless each class
member claims at least $75,000 in damages. If the court is in the juris-
diction that does not follow Zahn's aggregation rules,158 it will exercise
its jurisdiction over the class action suit under the doctrine of supple-
mental jurisdiction unless no member of the class can claim $75,000.
Thus, the section of the Act concerning aggregation does not make
the law on that subject more uniform, but it does bring larger class
actions into federal courts. At the same time, it seems to discourage
plaintiffs' counsel from strategically claiming smaller damages per
154. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a), 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2005)) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000,
exclusive of interest and costs .... ").
155. Id. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(6) (2005)) ("In any class action, the claims
of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.").
156. Id.
157. The Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have taken the view that Zahn continues in force
notwithstanding the enactment of § 1367. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
158. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have ruled that enactment of
supplemental jurisdiction statute overruled Zahn. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:385
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005
member in order that removal be impossible. The provision, however,
does nothing to prevent such artful pleading in cases involving less than
$5,000,000 worth of damages. Nor does it stop counsel from tactically
claiming a lesser total amount to ensure that the case stays in a state
court. In effect, this provision could discourage plaintiffs' attorneys
from notifying as many potential class members as possible because if
the amount of damages exceeds $5,000,000, the case will be subject to
removal to a federal court. Yet, $5,000,000 is not a large amount for
current class action lawsuits, and many of them involve well over that
amount just in compensatory damages alone. Only time will tell
whether plaintiffs' counsel strategically pleading less than five million
dollars in damages will become a problem.
2. THE OVERBURDENING OF FEDERAL COURTS
Regardless of the effect that the Act might have on plaintiffs' art-
fully pleading their complaints, it expands the original jurisdiction of
federal courts in cases involving state law. This, in turn, has the poten-
tial to "choke Federal court dockets and delay or foreclose the timely
and effective determination" of class actions. 159 For example, "[tihe
Congressional Budget Office estimates that the newly enacted class
action legislation will move a projected 300 complex class action law-
suits from the states into the federal courts over the coming months."'16
According to Leonidas Ralph Mecham, director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, "[t]he Judiciary has neither the finan-
cial nor personnel resources to cover these new workload
requirements."
1 61
In addition, "handling class actions that originated in state court is
likely to be a low priority for federal judges . . . [since] among other
things the high number of criminal drug prosecutions in the federal sys-
tem ... demand attention due to speedy trial laws."'1 62 One Congress-
man pointed out that Citicorp's Smith Barney subdivision stated in
correspondence to all their investors that the class action legislation "is
designated to funnel class action suits with plaintiffs in different States
out of State courts and into the Federal court system, which is typically
much less sympathetic to such litigation." 163 Smith Barney further
advised its clients that the likely practical effect of the change will be
159. 151 CONG. REc. H726 (2005) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
160. Sentencing Appeals and Class Action Lawsuits Will Cost the Judiciary, THE THIRD
BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2005, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/marO5ttb/appeals/.
161. Id.
162. Lindeman, supra note 151, at 2516.
163. 151 CONG. REc. H733 (2005) (statement of Rep. Markey).
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that "many cases will never be heard given how overburdened Federal
judges are, which might help limit the number of cases." '164 Indeed, the
federal judiciary has a significantly smaller number of judges than the
state judiciaries. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, "[i]f Congress
enacts and the President signs new laws, allowing more cases to be
brought into the Federal courts, just filling the vacancies will not be
enough. We need additional judgeships."
' 165
Not only are class action plaintiffs likely to face delays in federal
courts, but they will also have to come before judges who are less famil-
iar with the state laws at issue. 166 The legislation puts federal judges in
a difficult position of interpreting a host of state law issues that do not
belong in federal courts in the first place. Many of the cases, in fact,
should remain in state courts because state judges are more familiar with
the law in their own states.
By expanding the federal courts' original jurisdiction to more class
action lawsuits that do not involve federal questions, the Act would
often require federal judges to apply state law to the facts of the case.
However, as one commentator noted, "federal courts are often more
timid in applying state law because when they do, federal judges view
themselves as interpreting somebody else's law." 167 If the case involves
a novel issue, the judge will be inclined to request that a state court
clarify a particular issue of state law, even though the case was removed
to federal court. Hence, the more cases are filed in or removed to fed-
eral courts pursuant to the Act, the more questions are going to be certi-
fied for state courts to answer, thus, in effect, defeating the purpose
behind the Act's new jurisdictional provision.
3. ELIMINATING COUPON SETTLEMENTS
The Act allows a federal court to approve a proposed settlement
under which class members would be awarded coupons only after a fair-
ness hearing. 168 It also imposes limits on attorneys' fees in settlements
involving coupons by requiring that a fee award be based on the value of
the coupons actually redeemed, rather than on the coupous issued.
169
Hence, class counsel will no longer be able to base their attorney's fees
164. Id; see also id. at H726 (statement of Rep. Conyers) (noting that a case winding its way
through the federal judicial system "will take far longer to resolve and is far less likely to be
certified").
165. Id. (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist).
166. See Lindeman, supra note 151, at 2516.
167. April Rockstead Barker, Wisconsin Legal Observers Believe Class Action Law Raises
Jurisdictional Issues, Wis. L.J., Mar. 23, 2005.
168. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 3(a), 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2005)).
169. Id. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2005)).
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on a settlement value that assumes a hundred percent redemption rate.
These new requirements may effectively eliminate coupon settlements
as an option because plaintiffs' lawyers will be reluctant to agree to
postpone the determination of the fees until the coupons are redeemed.
Before passage of the Act, class action plaintiffs' attorneys rou-
tinely based their fees on a percentage of the total dollar value of the
settlement, rather than coupons redeemed. They also sought court
approval of their fees when the settlement was reached. Under the Act,
however, the true value of the settlement will not be known until long
after settlement - until either all the coupons are redeemed or the cou-
pons have expired. Since attorneys are not likely to be willing to wait
for several years before recovering their fee or to allow an expert to
estimate the value of the redeemed coupons, as provided under the Act,
one commentator noted that "[t]he result is that there will probably be
more pure cash settlements."'
170
4. UPSETTING THE BALANCE BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL JUDICIARIES
The Act is contrary to the notions of federalism because it inter-
feres with the states' role as "laboratories for experimentation" devising
"various solutions where the best solution is far from clear." 17 1 Without
state court interpretations, states' bodies of law will not develop such
different solutions to new problems and will fail to guide future conduct
of businesses. Furthermore, according to one commentator, "[i]f all of
the decisions in an area of state law are issued by federal courts, that
could stunt the development of that field of law."
' 172
Moreover, deference to states' rights is one of the cornerstones of
the U.S. democracy, but the essence of the Act is the view that state
judiciaries are somehow less competent than federal courts. Quite to the
contrary, federal judges are not automatically more knowledgeable or
less biased as a result of their federal appointments. In addition, state
courts are held to the very same standards of due process as their federal
counterparts. State judiciaries are capable of self-regulation, and if state
judges fail to perform their duties appropriately, states have adequate
mechanisms for reprimanding them:
Where real problems with the certification process have occurred, the
offending States have responded with reforms aimed at improvement.
170. Lindeman, supra note 151, at 2516 (quoting John M. Majoras, a Washington, D.C.
attorney).
171. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
172. Barker, supra note 167 (quoting Scott Moss, Assistant Professor at Marquette University
Law School).
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In Alabama, the often-cited "swamp justice" State according to the
proponents of this legislation-both the legislature and the judiciary
have been acting to tighten class action procedure in response to
accusations for "drive-by" certifications.
173
Altering the delicate balance between state and federal judiciaries estab-
lished by the drafters of the Constitution and carefully engineered by
their contemporaries may prove to be a dangerous mistake.
IV. CONCLUSION
One can hardly deny that the class action device has significant
potential for abusive practices by the class counsel. Congress has been
struggling to come up with a solution to these problems since 1998, but
the severe criticisms by the opposition precluded the measure from mak-
ing it to the President's desk until this year. The Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 will likely lead to unwanted consequences because it is very
broad in scope, drastically changes the procedural law on class actions,
and fails to resolve the issues that worry its supporters. Finally, there
already exist numerous procedural mechanisms that the courts can use to
minimize class action abuse. Although there has been misuse of the
class action device, the abusive practices cannot be eliminated entirely
without eliminating the class actions themselves.
173. 149 CONG. REc. H5284 (2003) (statement of Rep. Jones).
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